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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
This paper aims to identify and investigate how financialisation has influenced the tax revenues 
in Europe by lowering tax rates and decreasing productive investments, which have changed 
the provision and the investment pattern in public social infrastructure. The paper first shows 
that the EU economies have increasingly been financialised according to some of the indicators 
of financialisation, specifically the share of FIRE (finance, insurance, and real estate) value 
added in GDP, FIRE’s share of employment in total employment, total debt in non-financial 
corporations, and capital account regulations. According to other indicators of financialisation 
such as property income received in non-financial firms’ value added, household indebtedness, 
and volume of stocks traded/GDP, the EU countries financialised until 2008; however, the 
financialisation trend slightly declined following the 2008 global economic crisis and the 
Eurozone crisis.  
The paper also shows that the growth of public education and healthcare expenditures in the 
EU declined through the 1990s and 2000s. The slowdown in the growth of public education and 
healthcare expenditures is noticeable, especially following the start of the Eurozone crisis. This 
paper discusses the role of financialisation in the making of the Eurozone crisis and shows that 
the Eurozone crisis led to austerity measures including significant cuts in public education and 
healthcare investment in the Southern European countries- Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and 
Cyprus.  
To examine the causal relationship between financialisation and public social investment in the 
EU-28, the paper conducts an econometric analysis for 1991–2017. Specifically, the paper 
examines the impact of the value added in the FIRE sector/GDP, domestic credit to private 
sector/GDP, total debt in non-financial corporations/GDP, household debt/GDP, and property 
income (interest, rent, dividend) received by non-financial firms as a share of their value added 
to the real growth of public healthcare and education expenditures. The econometric analysis 
shows that financialisation reduced the growth of GDP, tax revenues as a share of GDP, and 
hence, the growth of tax revenues in the EU-28 countries. The decline in the growth of tax 
revenues also led to austerity measures and lowered growth of public expenditures in education 
and healthcare. Estimations based on different measures of financialisation find that a standard 
deviation increase in a measure of financialisation reduced the yearly growth in public 
healthcare expenditures between 0.56 and 1.19 percentage points. A standard deviation in a 
measure of financialisation pulled down the yearly growth in public education expenditures also 
between 0.56 and 1.19 percentage points. The negative impact of financialisation is larger on 
the growth in public primary and secondary school expenditures.  
Last, the paper discusses whether financialisation could create new schemes to replace the 
public social expenditures.  For this purpose, the paper focuses on the role of student loans in 
higher education in the United Kingdom and private health insurance schemes in the 
Netherlands and Germany. Following the introduction of tuition fees supported by student loans, 
the enrolment rates in tertiary education in the UK have stagnated, while the student debt has 
been geometrically rising. The student debt/GDP in the UK increased from 0.67% in 2002/03 to 
2.63% in 2011/12 and to 5.75% in 2017/18 following the higher education reforms.  
The paper also shows that private healthcare insurance schemes did not lead to a significant 
success in the Netherlands and Germany. In the Netherlands, the healthcare system is entirely 
based on private insurance schemes, and in Germany higher-income individuals can choose 
between public and private health insurance schemes. Although the per capita healthcare 
expenditures are significantly higher in the Netherlands than in the EU-15, life expectancy is 
lower than the EU-15 average. On the other hand, empirical evidence from Germany showed 
that the dual system generated an ‘adverse selection’ problem, since more healthy individuals 
were more likely to switch to the private insurance system (Panthöfer, 2016) and the less 
healthy were more likely to switch to the public (Grunow and Nuscheler, 2014). The ‘adverse 
selection’ problem left the public insurance system in Germany with relatively unhealthy 
individuals and increased costs. 
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1. Introduction 
In the post-1980 period, the European countries experienced a rising share of financial activities 
and incomes and a growing influence of the financial sector on non-financial firms and 
households, which is known as ‘financialisation.’ As a part of financialisation, the GDP and 
employment shares of the financial, insurance, and real estate (FIRE) sector, the property 
revenues of non-financial companies in their value added, the domestic credit provided to private 
sector, indebtedness of non-financial firms, and indebtedness of households increased. Moreover, 
the capital flows were significantly deregulated in countries that are currently part of the EU-281 
(Figures 1–8).  
The growth in tax revenues in the EU-28 also slightly declined between 1990 and 2008. 
However, the growth in tax revenues collapsed following the Eurozone crisis and the slowdown 
in the European economies, to which financialisation in Europe contributed (Carballo-Cruz, 
2011; Barradas et. al, 2018). The decline in the growth of tax revenues was followed by severe 
austerity measures in the public education and healthcare sectors. The austerity cuts in public 
education and healthcare were especially noticeable in the Southern European economies 
(Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) that were most affected by the crisis. 
This paper aims to examine the impact of financialisation on public education and 
healthcare expenditures in the European Union. Financialisation in Europe is an impediment to 
the growth of public social spending through decreasing growth of tax revenues. Using an 
econometric analysis, this study finds that financialisation reduced GDP growth and also lowered 
taxes collected as a share of GDP. These two factors had a negative combined effect on the 
growth of tax revenues in the EU. The results also show that lower growth in tax revenues 
reduced the growth of public healthcare expenditures and the growth of public education 
expenditures, particularly for primary and secondary education. Several previous studies 
empirically examine the impact of financialisation on capital accumulation (e.g., Orhangazi, 
2008; Tori and Onaran, 2018, 2019), inequality (e.g., Kohler, Guschanski and Stockhammer, 
2019; Stockhammer, 2017), and tax revenues (Tomaskovic-Devey, Lin and Meyers, 2015). 
However, this paper is the first study that predicts the impact of financialisation on public social 
expenditures using an econometric analysis. 
Last, following a group of studies that approach financialisation by focusing on the 
‘financialisation of the everyday’ (van der Zwan, 2004), the paper examines three cases in which 
the welfare state was replaced by financial products. The paper discusses the introduction of 
tuition fees in higher education with the support of student loans in the UK and the cases of 
mandatory private health insurance schemes in the Netherlands and Germany.  
																																								 																				
1 The paper examines the impact of financialisation on the EU-28 countries; nevertheless, not all the countries were 
part of the European Union during the examined period. Indeed, Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom in 
1973; Greece in 1981; Portugal and Spain in 1986; Austria, Finland, and Sweden in 1995; Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia in 2004; Bulgaria and Romania in 2007; 
and Croatia in 2013 became EU members. The United Kingdom is expected to exit from the European Union by the 
end of January 2020 that this paper is published. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section discusses the different aspects 
of financialisation and exhibits the trend of financialisation in the European Union countries. The 
third section shows and discusses the trends in public social expenditures and tax revenues in the 
EU countries. The fourth section theoretically discusses the channels through which 
financialisation would affect tax revenues. The fifth section empirically tests the impact of five 
different measures of financialisation on the growth of public education and healthcare 
expenditures through tax revenues. The sixth section discusses the impact of tuition fees and 
student loans on higher education in the United Kingdom and also the effects of private health 
insurance schemes in the Netherlands and Germany. The last section concludes and discusses the 
policy implications of the paper’s findings. 
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
2. An overview of financialisation in the European Union 
‘Financialisation’ broadly refers to the rising share of financial activities associated with the 
growing financial sector and also the influence of those financial activities in the non-financial 
sector’s and households’ decisions and incomes. According to the widely followed definition2 of 
Gerald A. Epstein (2005), financialisation is “the increasing role of financial motives, financial 
markets, financial actors, and financial institutions in the operation of the domestic and 
international economies.” Consistent with the broad definition of financialisation, 
financialisation is measured by the size of the financial and/or FIRE (finance, insurance, and real 
estate) sector (Krippner, 2005; Hein et. al., 2017; Hein et. al., 2018), the volume of financial 
transactions and private debt held by and/or credits given to non-financial firms (Palley, 2013; 
Davis, 2016; Karwowski and Stockhammer, 2017) and households (Lapavitsas and Powell, 
2013; Kim, 2013), financial activities and incomes of non-financial firms and households 
(Stockhammer, 2004; Krippner, 2005; Orhangazi, 2008; Dünhaupt, 2016), and the extent of 
deregulations in the financial markets (Kohler, Guschanski and Stockhammer, 2019).  
Figures 1–8 below measure the trends in financialisation in the European Union using 
eight different indicators. The figures mainly reflect that the role of finance in the EU increased 
between 1970 and 2008. According to some of the indicators, financialisation, including FIRE’s 
share of value added in GDP, FIRE’s share of employment in total employment, indebtedness in 
non-financial corporations as a share of GDP, and capital account regulations, the growth of 
financialisation stagnated following the global economic crisis in 2008 and the Eurozone crisis. 
According to the other indicators of financialisation, including property income received as a 
share of non-financial firms’ value added, indebtedness in the non-financial sector, household 
indebtedness, and volume of stocks traded/GDP, the level of financialisation slightly declined in 
the post-2008 period. 
 
i) FIRE (finance, insurance, and real estate) sector’s value-added share in GDP and FIRE 
sector’s share in total employment 
FIRE’s share of value added in the EU-15 increased around 5 percentage points from 1978 to 
1996, and it fluctuated in the 15–17% range between 1996 and 2015 (Figure 1). In the EU-28 
area, FIRE’s value-added share in GDP increased by 1.3 percentage points in 2000–2015. 
Similarly, Figure 2 shows that the employment share of FIRE in the EU-15 increased from 2.4% 
to 4.0% between 1970 and 1995, and it did not significantly change in the post-1995 period. 
Figure 2 also exhibits that the employment share of FIRE in the EU-28 did not significantly 
change between 2000 and 2015. In summary, the financial, insurance, and real estate (FIRE) 
sector became more significant in the EU economies between 1978 and 1995; however, the 
																																								 																				
2 Epstein (2005)’s definition is widely followed in the financialisation literature, as Epstein’s book chapter is one of 
the earliest works that used the term ‘financialisation.’ Epstein’s definition quoted in this paper was previously 
quoted by 427 other studies, and Epstein’s book chapter that includes this definition received over 2,000 citations 
according to Google Scholar (2019). 
value-added share and employment shares of FIRE in GDP and total employment did not 
significantly change in the post-1995 period.	
	
	
	
Notes: Data for the figures reflect the values for the whole area indicated. Several countries are excluded from data 
due to missing data in the indicated countries. Figure 1 and Figure 2 are the author’s calculations based on EU 
Klems (2009) and EU Klems (2018). Figure 3 is author’s calculations based on Eurostat (2019). The property 
income includes interest, distributed income of corporations (including dividends) and rent incomes received by 
non-financial corporations. Figure 4 is author’s calculations based on World Bank’s (2019) World Development 
Indicators.	
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Figure 1: Value added share of Financial, Insurance 
and Real Estate (FIRE) sectors in GDP in EU-28 
and EU-15 (%, 1970-2015) 
EU-15 (Klems 2017) EU-15 (Klems 2009) 
EU-28 (Klems 2017) 
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Figure 2: Financial, Insurance and Real Estate 
(FIRE) sectors' share of employment in total 
employment in EU-28 and EU-15 (%, 1970-2015) 
EU-15 (Klems 2017) EU-15 (Klems 2009) 
EU-28 (Klems 2017) 
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Figure 3: Property (interest, rent, dividend) income 
received by non-financial firm as a share of value 
added in non-financial firms (%, 1995-2017) 
EU-15 
EU-15 (Spain excluded) 
EU-28 (Malta, Croatia excluded) 
EU-28 (Spain, Malta, Croatia excluded) 
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Figure 4: Value of stocks traded/GDP in EU-15 (%, 
1982-2014)  
EU-15 
EU-15 (Denmark, Finland, Sweden excluded) 
EU-15 (Ireland and Portugal excluded) 
ii) Property income received by non-financial firms  
The non-financial firms in the EU-15 and the EU-28 increased their financial activities between 
1995 and 2008. However, the financial activities of non-financial firms slightly declined post-
2008. Figure 3 reflects the share of received property incomes in non-financial firms’ value 
added. The property income includes interest, distributed income of corporations (including 
dividends), and rent incomes received by non-financial corporations. According to the 
calculations based on Eurostat (2019), from 1995 to 2008, the share of property income in non-
financial corporations’ value added increased both in the EU-15 and the EU-28. Property 
income’s share declined in the post-2008 period; however, in 2017 it was still above the level in 
1995. The trend in Figure 3 is consistent with Tori and Onaran’s (2019) calculations based on 
firm-level data. Tori and Onaran (2019) show that total financial profits as a share of fixed assets 
(%) in non-financial corporations in EU-15 increased between 1995 to 2007 and declined 
following the economic crisis in 2008, but it was still above the level in 1995 by 2017.  
The share of property incomes in non-financial corporations’ value added cannot be 
calculated for pre-1995 due to missing data in Eurostat for EU-28 countries. However, the data 
for Sweden and France gives us an idea of the trend for property incomes in non-financial 
corporations. In Sweden, received property incomes’ share in non-financial corporations’ value 
added increased from 9.4% in 1975 to 27.8% in 1995, reached 40.8% in 2007, and declined back 
to 27.3% by 2017. Similarly, in France, property incomes’ share in non-financial corporations’ 
value added increased from 7.7% to 13.9% between 1978 and 1995, reached 30.4% in 2008, and 
dropped down to 22.4% in 2017. 
 
iii) Volume of stocks traded  
Figure 4 shows the total value of stocks traded as a share of GDP (%) in the EU-15 area, which 
is an indicator of financial activities of both financial and non-financial corporations. Total value 
of stocks traded/GDP (%) on average followed a positive trend between 1982 and 2007 in EU-15 
with two peaks in 2000 and 2007. Following the global economic crisis in 2008, the total value 
of stocks traded as a share of GDP (%) also declined until 2013 and slightly bounced back in 
2014. 
 
iv) Domestic credits provided to private sector by financial corporations 
Figure 5 exhibits that the credits to the private sector expanded until the start of the Eurozone 
crisis and declined in post-2009 in the EU countries. Figure 5 shows that the domestic credit to 
private sector/GDP (%) in the EU-28 and the EU-15 increased between 2001 and 2009 and 
declined after 2009.  
 
 Notes: Data for the figures reflect the values for the whole area indicated. Indicated countries are excluded from data 
due to missing data. Figure 5 is author’s calculations based on the World Bank’s (2019) World Development 
Indicators. Figure 6 and Figure 7 are author’s calculations based on Bank for International Settlements (2019).  
Figure 8 is author’s calculations based on Chinn and Ito (2018) and reflects the GDP weighted average of Chinn and 
Ito Capital Account Openness Index for listed country groups.  
 
v) Indebtedness in private non-financial corporations  
Figure 6 shows the debt in non-financial corporations as a share of GDP (%). The data for the 
pre-1995 period is limited for most of the EU economies. However, the blue line in Figure 6 
shows that debt in non-financial corporations/GDP increased slightly between 1976 and 1995 in 
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Figure 5: Domestic credit to private sector/GDP (%, 
2001-2017)  
EU-28 EU-15 
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Figure 6: Total debt in non-financial corporations/
GDP (%, 1976 - 2017) 
Finland, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom 
EU-15 (excluding Ireland, Luxembourg) + Hungary, Poland, Czech 
Republic 
EU-15 + Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland 
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Figure 7: Household debt/GDP in EU-15 and 
Hungary, Poland and Czech Republic  (%, 
1970-2017)  
Finland, Germany, Italy, UK 
EU-15 (excluding Ireland, Luxembourg) + Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland 
EU-15 + Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland 
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Figure 8: Chinn and Ito Capital Account Openness 
Index (1970-2016) 
EU-15 (excluding Luxembourg) 
EU-28 (excluding Luxembourg) 
the area covering Finland, Germany, Italy, and the UK. The red line on the EU-15 (excluding 
Luxembourg and Ireland) and the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland hints that indebtedness 
in private non-financial corporations started to increase significantly in 1998 and the rise 
continued until 2008. The green line on the EU-15 and the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland 
shows that the indebtedness in private non-financial corporations as a share of GDP stagnated 
and did not significantly change (declined only by 1.1 percentage points) in the post-2009 period. 
 
vi) Household indebtedness 
The data is also limited for household indebtedness; however, we see a trend similar to private 
non-financial sector debt for an area of four European countries with available long-term data. In 
1970–2009, household debt as a share of GDP (%) increased by 40 percentage points in the area 
of four EU economies (Finland, Germany, Italy, UK), and it slightly declined in the post-2009 
period (Figure 7). The trend is consistent with 1994–2017 data on the household indebtedness in 
the EU-15 and the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. 
 
vii) Capital account regulations 
Last, Chinn and Ito's Capital Account Openness Index shows that capital accounts in the 
European Union became increasingly open (Figure 8).  According to the Chinn and Ito Index, 
EU-15 countries experienced significant capital account deregulations in two waves, during 
1978–1983 and 1988–1993. The Chinn and Ito Index for EU-15 converged close to its maximum 
level (Chinn and Ito Index = 1) in the mid-2000s.  The Chinn and Ito Index for the EU-28 area 
also converged close to its maximum level in the mid-2000s and stayed at this level (0.980-
0.983) throughout the post-2008 period. 
 	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
3. An overview of growth in social spending and taxation in the European Union 
This section examines the general trends in the growth of public expenditures in healthcare and 
education in the European Union. The growth rate of public healthcare and education 
expenditures are driven by change in the share of public social expenditures in GDP and GDP 
growth rates. The shares of public healthcare and education expenditures in GDP might be 
misleading figures for our purposes, since they do not capture financialisation’s impact on social 
expenditures through economic growth. Indeed, financialisation’s possible negative effects on 
the private sector might raise the shares of public healthcare and education expenditures in GDP 
by keeping the value added in the other components of GDP (e.g., private industry and services 
sectors) at lower levels. 
	
Notes: Author’s own calculations based on Eurostat (2019), the World Bank’s (2019) World Development 
Indicators, and UN-DESA’s (2018) World Population Prospects 2017. The growth in the public education 
expenditures measure reflects the real growth and is calculated using GDP (constant 2010 US$) multiplied by share 
of education expenditures in GDP. The population for ages 6–23 is listed for every 5 years. The yearly population 
growth for ages 6–23 is assumed to be constant over the 5-year periods. For 2016 and 2017, the population growth 
for ages 6–23 in 2010–2015 is used due to missing observation. Data for the figures reflects the values for the whole 
area indicated. Indicated countries are excluded from the data due to missing data. The moving average line shows 
the arithmetic mean of current data and past one-to-four-year lags. 
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Table 9: Growth in public education expenditures (%) and growth in 
public education expenditures per young person (aged 6-23, %) for 
EU-28  
Education exp growth (%, EU-28) 
Education exp growth (%, EU-28, Croatia and Slovenia excluded) 
Education exp per young growth (aged 6-23, %, EU-28) 
Education exp per young growth (aged 6-23, %, EU-28, Croatia and Slovenia excluded) 
5 per. Mov. Avg. (Education exp per young growth (aged 6-23, %, EU-28, Croatia and Slovenia excluded)) 
Figure 9 shows the growth in public education expenditures for 1996–2017 in the region 
that is currently part of the EU-28.  Due to lack of data availability, the red dashed line shows the 
growth in public education expenditures for 1996–2017 in the EU-28 countries excluding Croatia 
and Slovenia. The blue line shows the growth in public education expenditures in the EU-28 
countries for 2002–2017 and overall reflects a very similar trend with the red dashed line. 
Overall, the growth in public education expenditures in the EU fluctuated until 2009 and 
significantly declined following the Eurozone crisis and slowdown of European economies, 
which is related to financialisation as will be discussed in the following section. 
	
Notes: Author’s own calculations based on Eurostat (2019), World Bank’s (2019) World Development Indicators 
and UN-DESA’s (2018) World Population Prospects 2017. The growth in public healthcare expenditures measure 
shows the real growth and is calculated using GDP (constant 2010 US$) multiplied by share of healthcare 
expenditures in GDP. Data for the figures reflect the values for the whole area indicated. Indicated countries are 
excluded from data due to missing data.  The moving average line shows the arithmetic mean of current data and 
past one to four year lags.	
	
-1 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
Table 10: Growth in public healthcare expenditures (%) and growth in 
per capita public healthcare expenditures (%) for EU-28 (1996-2017)  
Health exp growth (%, EU-28, Croatia and Slovenia excluded) 
Health exp growth (%, EU-28) 
Per capita health exp growth (%, EU-28, Croatia and Slovenia excluded) 
Per capita health exp growth (%, EU-28) 
5 per. Mov. Avg. (Per capita health exp growth (%, EU-28, Croatia and Slovenia excluded)) 
In Figure 9, the green line and dashed purple line consider that the change in the growth 
of public education expenditures could be influenced by the change in growth of the school-age 
population and therefore demonstrate the growth for public education expenditures per young 
person aged between 6 and 23. Both lines also show that the growth in public education 
expenditures per young person fluctuated until 2009 and significantly decreased following the 
Eurozone crisis. Moreover, the five-year averages of the growth in public education expenditures 
per young person in the EU-28 countries (excluding Croatia and Slovenia) was 4.2% in 1998–
2002 and declined to 0.1% in 2011–2015 following the Eurozone crisis. 
Next, Figure 10 exhibits that the growth in public healthcare expenditures followed a 
similar trend to the growth in public education expenditures. The public healthcare expenditures 
growth in the EU-28 countries fluctuated between 1996 and 2009 but did not experience a 
permanent decline until 2009. However, the growth in public education expenditures had a long-
term decline following the Eurozone crisis. In Figure 10, dashed green and purple lines 
demonstrate growth in per capita public healthcare expenditures. The 5-year moving average for 
growth in per capita public healthcare expenditures in the EU-28 (excluding Croatia and 
Slovenia) was in the range of 2.9–4.5% until 2009 and significantly declined in the post-2009 
period. 
	
Table 1: Growth in public healthcare and education expenditures in the given periods 
following the Eurozone crisis  
  Education Healthcare 
  Growth (%, 2009-2013) 
Growth (%, 
2009-2017) 
Growth (%, 
2009-2013) 
Growth (%, 
2009-2017) 
Cyprus -6.4 -15.0 -3.9 -12.8 
Greece -15.1 -26.6 -40.8 -39.8 
Italy -12.6 -15.6 -6.2 -7.8 
Portugal -19.6 -27.5 -23.1 -23.1 
Spain -15.8 -8.6 -13.7 -7.1 
Notes: Author’s own calculations based on Eurostat (2019) and the World Bank’s (2019) World Development 
Indicators. The growth in public education and public healthcare expenditures measure show the real growth and are 
calculated using GDP (constant 2010 US$) multiplied by shares of education and healthcare expenditures in GDP. 
	
The decline in the growth in public healthcare and education expenditures is more 
noticeable in the Southern European economies that have been experiencing the Eurozone crisis. 
Severe austerity measures have been implemented in the countries that have struggled with the 
Eurozone crisis (Table 1). In Greece, public education and public healthcare expenditures 
respectively declined by 26.6% and 39.8% in real terms between 2009 and 2017. Nevertheless, 
the austerity measures in education were the largest in Portugal (even larger than Greece). The 
public education spending in Portugal was reduced by 27.5% between 2009 and 2017. Similarly, 
severe austerity measures were implemented in public education in Italy. The public education 
expenditures declined by 15.6% in Italy in real terms in 2009–2017. 
The growth in tax revenues would be expected to significantly influence public education 
and healthcare expenditures, since tax revenues finance the public social infrastructure. The 
dashed red line in Figure 11 shows that the growth in tax revenues in the EU-15 (excluding 
Belgium and Spain) fluctuated between 1974 and 2017. The blue line in Figure 11 shows the 
growth in tax revenues in countries that currently form the EU-28 and follows a trend similar to 
the red line that shows the growth in tax revenues the EU-15. 
	
Notes: Author’s own calculations based on the World Bank’s (2019) World Development Indicators. Both lines 
exhibit the real growth in tax revenues. Indicated countries are excluded from the data due to missing data.  Due to 
missing data, the tax revenue for Greece in 1991–1994 is calculated assuming the yearly growth rate in tax revenues 
between 1990–1995 was constant in Greece. The moving average line shows the arithmetic mean of current data and 
past one-to-four-year lags.	
		
The black line shows the five-year moving averages for the growth in tax revenues in the 
EU-15 (excluding Belgium and Spain) and reflects that the moving average of growth in tax 
revenues fluctuated around 2.8–4.7% in 1978–1992. The growth in tax revenues in the EU-15 
(excluding Belgium and Spain) declined in the first half of 1990s, and it temporarily increased 
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Figure 11: Growth in tax revenues in EU-28 and EU-15 (%, 1974 - 
2017) 
EU-28 EU-15 (Belgium and Spain excluded) 5 per. Mov. Avg. (EU-15 (Belgium and Spain excluded)) 
and exceeded 4% in the second half of the 1990s. Nevertheless, in 2002–2008, the five-year 
moving averages for the growth in tax revenues in the EU-15 (excluding Belgium and Spain) 
was 0.8–2.7%, a level below the 1978–1992 period. Last, following the year 2009, the five-year 
moving averages for growth in tax revenues in the EU-15 (excluding Belgium and Spain) 
significantly declined to a level below zero and returned back only to 2.1% in 2017. 
 The general trends in growth in public social expenditures and measures of 
financialisation themselves do not give a clear picture on the causal relationship between 
financialisation and public social infrastructure. The next two sections of this paper will discuss 
the possible mechanisms through which financialisation could influence public social 
expenditures in the European Union and predict the direction and magnitude of the causal effect 
of financialisation on growth in public social expenditures.  
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
4. Financialization and public social expenditures in the European Union 
Financialisation negatively affects both the growth of taxes and share of taxes in GDP (%), 
which in turn reduces the growth of taxes collected by the government. As an outcome, 
financialisation also reduces the growth of public education and healthcare expenditures. The 
mechanism by which financialisation could influence public education and healthcare 
expenditures is summarised in Figure 12. The following subsections evaluate the channels in 
Figure 12 and provide empirical evidence on the proposed channels. 
 
Figure 12: The impact of financialisation on public education and public healthcare 
expenditures 
	
	
4.1 Financialisation and growth 
The possible link between financialisation and growth is widely discussed in the literature. 
Several works focus on financialisation’s influence on investment behaviour through shareholder 
orientation.  As noted in Crotty (1990), managers and owners have different priorities. Managers 
prioritise long-term growth and the safety of enterprises. However, increasingly, financial 
institutions rather than individuals own the majority of stocks of companies and dominate stock 
trading, and these institutions tend to turn over a great share of their stocks within a year. As a 
result, a larger proportion of owners tends to prioritise short-term capital gains. Similarly, 
Stockhammer (2004) argues that financialisation has changed management priorities in favour of 
shareholders who consider short-term returns as opposed to long-term growth of companies. This 
has reduced the growth and capital accumulation of companies. This is partially because the 
shareholder orientation associated with financialisation has led top management to shift from a 
“retain and reinvest” to a “downsize and distribute” strategy (Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000). 
Hence, the top management is less interested in reinvestment of profits on physical capital and 
complementary human resources and rather tends to distribute profits consistent with the 
interests of stockholders.  
 On the other hand, Boyer (2000) indicates that “finance-led growth” could be possible, 
since easy access to credit could stimulate consumption. Higher consumption enhances 
investment and could overcome the negative effects of shareholder orientation.  However, 
“finance-led growth” is possible only when easing access to credit could sufficiently stimulate 
consumption and the propensity to consume for rentiers is sufficiently high. On the other hand, 
Dutt (2006) shows that higher consumer borrowing could reduce consumption in the long run by 
increasing consumers’ debt burden. Moreover, it might lead to the redistribution of income 
towards rentiers and reduce consumption, since the rentiers’ propensity to consume is lower 
compared to workers. Moreover, a debt-led growth regime enhanced by consumer loans could 
lead to structural instabilities and economic crises as shown in various economic models (Botta 
et. al, 2018; Kumhof, Ranciere and Winant, 2015; Setterfield and Kim, 2016; Setterfield, Kim 
and Rees, 2016) and observed in the US economic crisis in 2008 (Stockhammer, 2015; Kumhof, 
Ranciere and Winant, 2015). 
The growth in consumer loans is supported by another aspect of financialisation: 
financial innovations and securitization (Stockhammer, 2012). Securitization might increase 
access to credit; however, it could reduce economic activity if it leads to excessive debt burdens 
and defaults (Bertay, Gong and Wagner, 2017). This is because securitization reduces banks’ 
incentives for screening and monitoring, which leads to low-quality loans. Indeed, using a panel 
of 104 countries, Bertay, Gong and Wagner (2017) empirically found that securitization of 
household loans led to an increase in the share of nonperforming loans in total loans and also a 
decline in investment growth over the period 1995–2012. 
The short-termism and increasing shareholder orientation are reflected in the rising 
corporate debt of non-financial firms, which is another characteristic of financialisation (Palley, 
2013; Davis, 2016) that might impede economic growth. The rise in corporate debts is pushed by 
increasing dividend payments and financial asset acquisitions (Davis, 2017) as opposed to rising 
physical investments. Indeed, companies used a significant proportion of their borrowing in post-
1980 for repurchase of their own stocks (Palley, 2013). The stock buybacks of companies clearly 
reflects the shareholder orientation, since stock buybacks aim to improve the stock market 
valuations of companies. The financial payments due to higher indebtedness of non-financial 
firms and rising distribution of dividends might reduce investments through decreasing available 
sources for physical investments (Orhangazi, 2008). Increasing financial payments could also 
shorten the planning horizons of companies and increase uncertainty on companies’ ability to 
finance projects in the future.  
Several previous studies examined the outcomes of financial incomes and financial 
payments in Europe on growth and capital accumulation. In an earlier work, Stockhammer 
(2004) found that interest and dividend income in non-financial companies as a share of their 
value added reduced the output growth in France in 1978–1997. In a firm-based analysis, Tori 
and Onaran (2019) find that both financial payments (interest and dividends) and financial 
incomes in non-financial corporations reduce the capital accumulation in the non-financial 
corporations in the 14 EU countries (EU-15 except Luxembourg). In a separate study, Tori and 
Onaran (2018) also find a negative impact of financial payments (interest and dividends) and 
financial incomes in non-financial corporations on capital accumulation in the non-financial 
corporations specifically in the UK. Last, using panel data composed of 27 European countries, 
Barradas (2017) finds that non-financial corporations’ financial investments and their interest 
and dividend payments reduced their real investments in 1995–2013. 
 
	Notes: Author’s calculations based on the World Bank’s (2019) World Development Indicators. The growth values 
reflect growth in GDP (constant 2010 US$).	
 
The significant expansion and rising debt burden in the non-financial corporations and 
households was an impediment on the four Southern European economies (Greece, Italy, Spain, 
and Portugal) during the Eurozone crisis that emerged in 2008. Following the Eurozone crisis, 
Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal experienced significant contraction in their economies 
between 2009 and 2013 (Figure 13). The growth rates in Greece, Italy, and Portugal were also 
-10 
-8 
-6 
-4 
-2 
0 
2 
4 
6 
8 
Figure 13: GDP growth (%) in selected Southern European countries, 
EU-15 and EU-28 (2000-2017) 
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below 2% for 2014–2016. Cyprus in 2014 and Greece in 2015 and 2016 still experienced 
negative growth rates.   
Figure 14 and Figure 15 respectively show that debt in non-financial corporations/GDP 
and household debt/GDP in Portugal and Spain significantly increased and surpassed the overall 
levels in the EU in 2000s. The indebtedness in non-financial corporations and household 
indebtedness were at their peak in Spain and Portugal during the Eurozone crisis. In the case of 
Spain, the favourable conditions for mortgages generated a housing boom and led to the 
expansion in the construction sector supported by credit expansion in 1997–2007 (Carballo-Cruz, 
2011). Nevertheless, the housing boom started to reach its limits in Spain by 2007. In 2007, 
housing sales significantly declined, and the housing prices started to fall. The downturn in the 
housing market also raised solvency concerns in the Spanish banking sector by 2009. As a result 
of the intensification of problems in the banking sector, the Spanish banks reduced their credits 
to companies and households. The decline in credit availability also pulled the consumption and 
investments in Spain down, since non-financial firms and households who already faced the 
burden of debt payments had to reduce their expenditures.    
 
Source: Bank for International Settlements (2019) and author’s calculations based on Bank for International 
Settlements.  Note: Debt in non-financial corporations includes debt in both private and public non-financial 
corporations. 
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Figure 14:  Debt in non-financial corporations/GDP (%) in selected 
Southern European countries, EU-15 and EU-28 (2000-2017) 
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Compared to Spain, the crisis in Portugal is more associated with sovereign debt; 
however, the growth of indebtedness in the private sector and of households also negatively 
contributed to the crisis. In Portugal, the legislation on securitisation in 2000 increased the use of 
credit securitisation in the 2000s (Barradas et. al., 2018). The credit securitisation allowed the 
Portuguese banks to provide credits at a lower cost, which pushed the growth of mortgage loans, 
consumer loans, and loans to small and medium enterprises. The growth of private loans left 
Portuguese banks with low capital adequacy ratios when the Eurozone crisis emerged. Moreover, 
due to their high indebtedness, credit agencies reduced the ratings of most Portuguese 
companies. 
Tori and Onaran (2017) for Spain and Portugal and Barradas and Lagoa (2017) for 
Portugal empirically estimate that the financial payments hamper real investments in these 
countries. Hence, the debt burden on non-financial firms in Spain and Portugal could have 
reduced capital accumulation and economic growth at the peak of Eurozone crisis, which in turn 
would have been an impediment to the growth of tax revenues and public social expenditures. 
Similarly, high household indebtedness could have limited the growth of tax revenues and public 
social expenditures by being an impediment to household consumption. 
 
Source: Bank for International Settlements (2019), Eurostat (2019), and author’s calculations based on Bank for 
International Settlements. 
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Figure 15:  Household debt/GDP (%) in selected Southern European 
countries, EU-15 and EU-28 (2000-2017) 
Cyprus 
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Portugal 
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EU-15 (excluding Ireland, 
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Although the crisis in Greece is mainly associated with the government debt crisis, Figure 
14 and Figure 15 respectively show that debt in non-financial corporations as a share of GDP 
(%) and household debt as a share of GDP (%) increased faster than the average of EU-15 + 
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in the 2000s. The rising indebtedness is more 
noticeable for household debt. The household debt in Greece started increase in 1994, when the 
ceiling on consumer loans was raised (Brissimis, Garganas and Hall, 2014). The growth of 
consumer loans accelerated in Greece when consumer credits were completely liberalised and 
the ceiling for consumer loans was abolished completely in mid-2003. As a result, household 
debt as a share of GDP (%) increased from 26.3% in 2003 to 57.8% in 2009 and increased 
further during the years of the Greek crisis. The interest payment burden on private non-financial 
firms and households might have contributed to the contraction of the Greek economy along with 
the public debt crisis.   
The Cyprus economy also experienced a slowdown starting in 2009, and GDP in Cyprus 
contracted by 5.9% in 2013 as an outcome of rapid growth in debt and a banking crisis 
(Demetriades, 2017). The growing debt in Cyprus was due to growth in household debt and 
private corporation debt along with the sovereign debt. Household debt/GDP in Cyprus increased 
from 69.2% in 2003 to 127.7% in 2013. The growth in household indebtedness in Cyprus was 
larger than in Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal between 2003 and 2013. The growth in housing 
debt was an important driver of the household credit boom, since housing loans increased by 
31.2% in 2006, 29.7% in 2007, and 22.6% in 2008 (Cleridesa and Stephanou, 2009). Moreover, 
the debt in private corporations as a share of GDP also increased from 175.3% in 2004 to 
211.9% in 20133 (Eurostat, 2019). As an outcome of rapidly growing debt, the stress tests in 
2011 conducted by European Banking Authority showed that Cyprus’s two largest banks, Laiki 
and Bank of Cyprus, experienced significant capital shortfalls (Demetriades, 2017). As Laiki 
experienced a danger of running out of cash in 2013, Laiki and Bank of Cyprus merged and were 
restructured through a bailout program (financed by IMF and ECB), which prevented further 
destruction via the on-going economic crisis. 
The growth in debt in households and non-financial corporations before the Eurozone 
crisis were lower in Italy compared to other Southern European countries. However, household 
debt-to-GDP ratio in Italy increased from 22.7% in 2000 to 42.5% in 2009 and debt in non-
financial corporations as a share of GDP rose from 55.9% in 2000 to 82.5% in 2009. The growth 
in the debts of households and non-financial corporations might have respectively reduced the 
consumption of households and investments of non-financial corporations in Italy and 
contributed to the economic contraction in the post-2008 period. 
The economic contraction of Southern European economies is also crucial for public 
social expenditures. As discussed in Table 1, the Eurozone crisis also led to severe austerity 
measures in Southern European economies targeting public education and healthcare spending 
																																								 																				
3 The indebtedness in private corporations in Cyprus is not shown in Figure 14, since the data is not compatible and 
only show the indebtedness in private corporations. 
between 2009 and 2013. Moreover, the contractions in public social expenditures continued in 
the post-2013 period in Greece, Portugal, and Italy. 
 
5.2 Financialisation and tax rates 
As an outcome of financialisation, the financial sector with the support of other businesses could 
promote a policy framework supporting the interests of the financial sector (Palley, 2013). The 
policy agenda of the financial sector includes financial deregulation and tax cuts along with 
labour market flexibility and abandonment of full-employment goals. The financialisation of 
Europe also promoted several policies including deregulation of financial markets and the 
lowering of top and corporate tax rates (Bieling, 2013). 
The financial sector is more influential on policymakers than other regulated sectors of 
the economy because of the intensity of its ties with the other sectors in the economy (Young and 
Pagliari, 2017). Due to the financial sector’s centrality in the economy, the broader business 
community outside financial sector is more likely to mobilise and express preferences that highly 
match with the preferences of the financial sector in an incidence of changing financial 
regulations4. 
 The growth in size strengthens the lobbying capabilities of the financial sector. Banks 
with greater financial sources can fund campaigns, obtain media coverage, and also gain greater 
capacity and technical knowledge to provide policy-relevant information and arguments 
(Chalmers, 2017; Baker, 2010).  A financial institution that could provide policy suggestions 
with greater expertise and information is more like to be influential. Indeed, in an empirical 
study for 33,000 banks from 179 countries, Chalmers (2017) shows that banks with greater assets 
are significantly more involved in lobbying activities. The increasing lobbying activities of banks 
also include lobbying against rising taxes on financial activities. 
An example of the influence of lobbying in the financial sector in Europe is the 
discussion on the Financial Transactions Tax. In 2011, the European Commission proposed an 
additional new tax on financial transactions (exchange of shares, bonds, and derivative contracts) 
that would generate an extra €57 billion tax revenue. Nevertheless, the large banks operating in 
Europe (e.g., Goldman Sachs, Deutsche Bank, Citigroup, and Morgan Stanley) and their 
lobbying associations (the International Banking Federation and the European Fund and Asset 
Management Association) started to lobby against the proposed Financial Transactions Tax by 
publishing various reports on the ‘negative effects of Financial Transactions Tax’ (Kastner, 
2018; Gabor, 2016). As a result of the noisy lobbying of the financial sector, the discussions on 
the Financial Transactions Tax were noticeably ‘quietened’ and the European Commission has 
not yet implemented the proposed tax. 
																																								 																				
4 In their study, Young and Pagliari (2017) also empirically find that higher business unity is observed in the 
incidence of financial regulations in the US and the EU compared to the cases of regulations in agriculture, energy, 
pharmaceuticals, and telecommunications. 
  The growth of financial activities of non-financial companies could also impose 
pressure on tax rates. Hein (2012) claims that increased shareholder value orientation and short-
termism reduce the bargaining power and activities of labour unions and change the distribution 
in favour of capital owners. Consistent with this Kohler, Guschanski and Stockhammer (2019) 
argue that financial globalisation generates exit options for capital, which worsens the bargaining 
power of labour and reduces wage shares. A similar argument could be made for tax rates and 
financialisation, because financialisation generates new options for capital movements to 
different markets in case of significant increases of taxes on corporations and top incomes.    
 
Table 2: Number of EU-28 economies with greater volatilities of foreign portfolio 
investment and foreign direct investment for the given periods.   
  1990-2018 1990-1999 2000-2009 2010-2018 
Number of countries with greater volatility of  
foreign portfolio investment (assets) 16 9 19 16 
Number of countries with greater volatility of 
foreign direct investment (assets) 12 4 9 12 
Number of countries with greater volatility of 
foreign portfolio investment (liabilities) 19 11 18 19 
Number of countries with greater volatility of 
foreign direct investment (liabilities) 9 2 10 9 
Notes: The volatility is measured by standard deviation of portfolio investment and direct investment reported in 
Eurostat’s (2019) balance of payments. The number of EU countries reported for 1990–1999 is 13 due to data 
limitations. 
 
The rise of financial portfolio investments generates greater flexibility and exit options 
than direct investments, as the movement of financial portfolio investments is less costly.  The 
more flexible characteristic of financial portfolio investments can be observed in Table 2, which 
hints that foreign portfolio investments are more volatile than foreign direct investments in the 
majority of the EU economies. Table 2 demonstrates the number of EU economies in which 
foreign portfolio investments (FPI) have greater standard deviation compared to the standard 
deviation of foreign direct investments (FDI) and the number of EU economies in which foreign 
direct investments have greater standard deviation compared to the standard deviation of foreign 
portfolio investments. The standard deviations for FDI and FPI are calculated in terms of assets 
(domestic residents’ investments abroad) and liabilities (foreigners’ investments in home 
country) for 1990–2018 and its sub-periods (1990–1999, 2000–2009, and 2010–2018). For both 
assets and liabilities, the five largest EU economies (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the 
United Kingdom) have larger volatility of FPI in their balance of payments for 1990–2018, and 
the countries with larger volatility of FDI are mainly small economies5. The majority of the EU-
28 economies also have greater volatility of FPI for each sub-period examined. 
																																								 																				
5 For assets in 1990–2018, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Germany, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Denmark, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania, Sweden, Bulgaria, and Estonia have greater volatility of foreign portfolio 
Various papers empirically examine the negative impact of financialisation on inequality 
by underlining the rising bargaining power of the financial sector (e.g., Kohler, Guschanski and 
Stockhammer, 2019; Stockhammer, 2017). Moreover, Tomaskovic-Devey, Lin, and Meyers 
(2015) find that financialisation in non-financial firms reduced the tax revenues in the US. 
However, to my knowledge, the impact of financialisation on tax revenues in the EU was not 
empirically predicted prior to this paper. The studies that empirically test the effect of 
financialisation on public social expenditures are very limited. Onaran and Boesch (2014) 
develop an index of globalisation, which includes portfolio investments, and an index of 
restrictions on trade and capital flows, along with trade, FDI, and income payments to foreign 
nationals. Using this measure, Onaran and Boesch show that globalisation respectively increased 
public expenditures in Western Europe and reduced public expenditures in Baltic countries. 
Globalisation also has mixed effects on the implicit tax rates in European countries with different 
types of political structures. However, Onaran and Boesch do not investigate the separate effect 
of the measures of financialisation on tax collection and public spending. 
 
 
 
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
investment, and Croatia, Romania, Finland, the Czech Republic, Poland, Malta, Cyprus, Austria, Belgium, Hungary, 
the Netherlands, and Luxembourg have greater volatility of foreign direct investment. For liabilities in 1990–2018, 
France, Italy, the United Kingdom, Spain, Germany, Ireland, Greece, Portugal, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, 
Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Poland, Lithuania, Slovakia, Latvia, Croatia, and Romania have greater volatility of 
foreign portfolio investment, and Estonia, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Austria, Malta, Belgium, Hungary, Luxembourg, and 
the Netherlands have greater volatility of foreign direct investment. 
5. Empirical Analysis 
This section examines the possible causal relationship between financialisation and public 
education and healthcare expenditures growth in the countries that are currently part of the EU-
28. Financialisation affects public social expenditures through its influence on tax revenues. 
Therefore, first, the impact of financialisation on the growth of tax revenues is tested using five 
different measures of financialisation. Second, the casual mechanism behind the influence of 
financialisation on public tax revenues is examined through testing the impact of financialisation 
on tax/GDP (%) and growth in GDP. Third, the econometric analysis investigates the impact of 
growth in tax revenues on growth in public education and public healthcare expenditures. Last, 
the section presents the economical significance of the coefficients estimated6. 
 
5.1 Data and variables 
The empirical analysis in this section tests the impact of financialisation through the five 
indicators discussed in Section 2. The five variables preferred are: 
i) The value-added share of financial, insurance, and real estate sector in GDP (FIRE VA/GDP, 
%) 
ii) Domestic credit to the private sector as a share of GDP (Credit/GDP, %)  
iii) Non-financial corporations’debt as a share of GDP (Nonfin debt/GDP, %)  
iv) Household debt as a share of GDP (House debt/GDP, %)  
v) Property income received by non-financial firms as a share of value added in non-financial 
firms (Nonfin property/VA, %).  
These measures are tested in separate regressions, since a change in one measure of 
financialisation is linked with the other five measures.  
 The analysis uses the growth in tax revenues as a dependent variable. The growth in tax 
revenues captures the impact of financialisation both through GDP growth and changes in the tax 
revenues/GDP (%). However, for examining the channels that affect growth in taxes, the analysis 
also estimates financialisation’s effect on tax revenues/GDP (%) and growth in GDP in separate 
regressions. The influence on education and healthcare is captured through the yearly growth in 
public education and public healthcare spending in the EU-28 countries.  
The estimations on the growth of tax revenues control for GDP per capita following 
Baumol’s (1986) idea of convergence clubs, which claims that the GDPs per capita with similar 
institutional structures would converge and hence the countries in the same ‘club’ would have 
																																								 																				
6 Alternative estimations in Appendix 1 examines the direct impact of financialisation on public healthcare 
expenditures and public social expenditures using the moving average of one to four year lags of the measures of 
financialisation. 
relatively lower growth rates. Following the Lewisian framework (Lewis, 1954), the less 
urbanised economies might have ‘unlimited supplies of labour’ that would enter the non-
subsistence economy and stimulate economic growth further. Therefore, the level of 
urbanization’s effect on the growth of tax revenues is also controlled. Since the impact of trade 
openness on growth (e.g., Dollar and Kraay, 2004; Yanıkkaya, 2003) and on tax rates (e.g., 
Rodrik, 1997; Bretschger and Hettich, 2002) is widely discussed, the ratio of trade flows as a 
share of GDP ([Exports+Imports]/GDP) is controlled in regressions for growth in tax revenues 
and GDP growth. The possible negative impact of inflation rate on GDP growth and growth in 
tax revenues is controlled through “log(inflation rate + minimum value of inflation rate + 1)”. 
This logarithmic conversion aims to converge the distribution of inflation rates to a normal 
distribution. However, inflation rate data has few negative values, which would drop out of the 
sample with simple logarithmic conversion; the conversion above prevents the loss of that data. 
The empirical analyses consider that the public social expenditures could grow with population. 
The regressions for growth in public education expenditures control for growth in the young 
population aged between 6 and 23, and the regressions for growth in healthcare control for the 
growth in total population. Last, the regressions for tax revenue as a share of GDP and growth in 
tax, education, and healthcare expenditures include a “left-wing government” dummy variable, 
as governments with social democrat, socialist, or radical-left tendencies would be expected to 
collect greater taxes and improve public social expenditures7. 
Tax revenue as a share of GDP data is from the World Bank’s (2018) World 
Development Indicators (2019). Growth in tax revenues, public education expenditures, and 
public healthcare expenditures data reflect the real growth and are calculated using real GDP 
(constant 2010 US$) data in the World Bank’s (2019) World Development Indicators multiplied 
by the shares of tax revenues, public education expenditures, and public healthcare expenditures 
in GDP from Eurostat (2019). The value-added share of the financial, insurance, and real estate 
sector in GDP is calculated using EU Klems (2018) and EU Klems (2009) datasets. Domestic 
credit to the private sector as a share of GDP, total value of stocks traded as a share of GDP, 
trade as a share of GDP, population growth, level of urbanization, rate of inflation, and GDP per 
capita data are from the World Bank’s (2019) World Development Indicators. Property income 
received by non-financial firms as a share of value added in non-financial firms is calculated 
from the Eurostat (2019) database. Non-financial corporations’debt/GDP (%) and household 
debt/GDP (%) are from the Bank for International Settlements (2018).  Last, the population 
growth data for ages 6–10, 11–17, and 18–23 are calculated using UN-DESA’s (2018) World 
Population Prospects 2017.  
 
																																								 																				
7 The parties that are associated with Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats, Greens-European Free 
Alliance, and European United Left-Nordic Green Left groups in the European Parliament and their preceding 
parties are considered as ‘left-wing’.  A country is considered to be governed by a left-wing government if the ‘de 
facto leader’ of the country was from a left-wing party for more than the half of the observed year.  The de facto 
leader for Cyprus, France, and Finland is considered to be the President, for Austria and Germany to be the 
Chancellor, and for other countries to be the Prime Minister. 
5.2 Empirical estimations 
First, the impact of indicators of financialisation on growth in tax revenues in the EU-28 is tested 
for 1991–2017. Due to possible endogeneity and reverse causality issues, the analysis uses one-
year lags of independent variables. Moreover, IV-2SLS with country-fixed effects is preferred. 
One-year lags of financialisation variables are instrumented with their two-year lags8.   
	
Table 3: Impact of financialisation on growth in tax revenues (%) in the EU-28, IV-2SLS 
fixed effects regressions (1991-2017)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
(FIRE VA/GDP)t-1  -0.613**     
 (0.294)     
(Credit/GDP)t-1  -0.082***    
  (0.020)    
(Nonfin debt/GDP)t-1   -0.035**   
   (0.017)   
(House debt/GDP)t-1    -0.111***  
    (0.027)  
(Nonfin property/VA)t-1     -0.153** 
     (0.074) 
(Log(GDP per capita)) t-1 -13.020*** -16.110*** -9.968* -4.274 -15.981*** 
 (3.210) (5.012) (5.251) (5.466) (3.861) 
Urbanisationt-1 0.014 0.039 -0.020 0.247* -0.128 
 (0.118) (0.220) (0.149) (0.148) (0.138) 
(Trade/GDP)t-1 0.039*** 0.033 0.037 0.000 0.080*** 
 (0.015) (0.031) (0.025) (0.019) (0.030) 
(Log(Inflation + x)) t-1 -5.530*** -5.768*** -6.549*** -7.151*** -3.674** 
 (1.264) (1.538) (1.682) (1.537) (1.567) 
Left government t 1.234* 0.600 1.041 0.963 1.121 
 (0.651) (0.760) (0.650) (0.645) (0.715) 
Kleibergen-Paap rk  
Wald F statistic 
975.494 707.434 154.308 2248.220 24.767 
Observations 659 404 418 418 562 
R-squared 0.087 0.141 0.099 0.107 0.088 
Number of Countries 28 28 18 18 27 
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses. Two-year lags for the 
indicators of financialisation are used as an instrument for one-year lag of indicators of financialisation. Stock-Yogo 
weak ID critical test values are 16.38 for a 0.1 maximal IV size, 8.96 for a 0.15 maximal IV size, 6.66 for a 0.2 
maximal IV size, and 5.53 for 0.25 maximal IV size. 
	
																																								 																				
8 Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistics show that two-year lags of financialisation variables are strong instruments 
for one-year lags of financialisation variables. 
Table 3 shows that domestic credits to the private sector (Credit/GDP) and household 
debt (House debt/GDP) have a significant negative impact at 1% level on tax revenue growth in 
the EU-28 countries. The value added in FIRE (FIRE VA/GDP), non-financial corporations’ 
debt (Nonfin debt/GDP), and property incomes of non-financial firms (Nonfin property/VA) also 
has a negative impact on growth in tax revenues, which is significant at 5% level. The results 
also highlight the possibility of income convergence within the EU, since the sign for log(GDP 
per capita) is significantly negative at 10% in four of five estimations. Moreover, the estimations 
show the significant negative effect of the inflation rate. The impact of a left-wing government is 
positive on growth of tax revenues in all estimations; however, the left-wing government’s 
coefficient is only significant at 10% in one of the estimations. 
 
Table 4: Impact of financialisation on tax revenue as a share of GDP (%) in the EU-28, IV-
2SLS fixed effects regressions (1991-2017)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
(FIRE VA/GDP)t-1  -0.268**     
 (0.123)     
(Credit/GDP)t-1  -0.045***    
  (0.013)    
(Nonfin debt/GDP)t-1   -0.011**   
   (0.005)   
(House debt/GDP)t-1    0.000  
    (0.010)  
(Nonfin property/VA)t-1     -0.045 
     (0.029) 
(Log(GDP per capita)) t-1 -0.520 0.265 -2.519** -2.463* -2.172** 
 (1.182) (1.841) (1.189) (1.429) (1.020) 
Urbanisationt-1 0.197*** 0.507*** 0.142*** 0.106** 0.314*** 
 (0.056) (0.112) (0.050) (0.050) (0.053) 
(Trade/GDP)t-1 -0.028** -0.028 0.005 -0.003 0.006 
 (0.013) (0.020) (0.007) (0.006) (0.012) 
(Log(Inflation + x)) t-1 -0.588 0.116 -0.969** -0.992** -0.143 
 (0.357) (0.395) (0.478) (0.494) (0.292) 
Left government t -0.065 0.511 0.333 0.303 0.795*** 
 (0.314) (0.315) (0.219) (0.217) (0.263) 
Kleibergen-Paap rk  
Wald F statistic 
987.279 707.434 157.369 2259.037 24.767 
Observations 662 404 420 420 562 
R-squared 0.053 0.083 0.069 0.056 0.054 
Number of Countries 28 28 18 18 27 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Country clustered standard errors in parentheses. Two-year lags for the 
indicators of financialisation are used as an instrument for one-year lag of indicators of financialisation. Stock-Yogo 
weak ID critical test values are 16.38 for a 0.1 maximal IV size, 8.96 for a 0.15 maximal IV size, 6.66 for a 0.2 
maximal IV size, and 5.53 for 0.25 maximal IV size. 
 
Next, the analysis examines the possible channels through which financialisation would 
affect growth in tax revenues. Table 4 and Table 5 respectively show the influence of 
financialisation on GDP growth and tax revenues/GDP (%) in the EU-28 countries. Due to the 
possible endogeneity issues, one-year lags of independent variables are used, and one-year lags 
of measures of financialisation were instrumented by their two-year lags. Table 4 shows that 
FIRE VA/GDP, Credit/GDP, and Nonfin debt/GDP have negative impact on tax revenues as a 
share of GDP, which are significant at 5% level. The evidence on the negative influence of 
Nonfin property/VA and House debt/GDP are insignificant at 10%.  
 
Table 5: Impact of financialisation on growth in GDP (%) in the EU-28, IV-2SLS fixed 
effects regressions (1991-2017)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
(FIRE VA/GDP)t-1  -0.556***     
 (0.091)     
(Credit/GDP)t-1  -0.077***    
  (0.009)    
(Nonfin debt/GDP)t-1   -0.019**   
   (0.007)   
(House debt/GDP)t-1    -0.103***  
    (0.011)  
(Nonfin property/VA)t-1     -0.076** 
     (0.034) 
(Log(GDP per capita)) t-1 -7.844*** -6.997*** -5.374*** -0.120 -10.192*** 
 (1.376) (1.861) (1.626) (1.620) (1.705) 
Urbanisationt-1 -0.048 -0.051 -0.150*** 0.145*** -0.236*** 
 (0.044) (0.092) (0.053) (0.054) (0.065) 
(Trade/GDP)t-1 0.027*** 0.010 0.020 -0.006 0.040*** 
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.014) 
(Log(Inflation + x)) t-1 -3.879*** -4.249*** -3.555*** -4.112*** -2.863*** 
 (0.631) (0.688) (0.968) (0.792) (0.770) 
Kleibergen-Paap rk  
Wald F statistic 
1035.527 728.116 173.315 2304.819 25.027 
Observations 674 404 428 428 562 
R-squared 0.213 0.324 0.173 0.288 0.194 
Number of Countries 28 28 18 18 27 
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses. Two-year lags for the 
indicators of financialisation are used as an instrument for one-year lag of indicators of financialisation. Stock-Yogo 
weak ID critical test values are 16.38 for a 0.1 maximal IV size, 8.96 for a 0.15 maximal IV size, 6.66 for a 0.2 
maximal IV size, and 5.53 for 0.25 maximal IV size. 
 
Table 5 reflects the impact of financialisation on growth in GDP. According to all 
measures of financialisation (FIRE VA/GDP, Credit/GDP, Nonfin debt/GDP, House debt/GDP, 
Nonfin property/GDP), financialisation significantly reduces economic growth at 5%. This is 
consistent with the literature discussed in Section 4.1.  
 
Table 6: Impact of growth in tax revenues (%) on growth of public healthcare and 
education expenditures (%) in the EU-28, fixed effects regressions (1991-2017)  
 Growth Public Health Exp. (%) Growth Public Education Exp. 
(%) 
 Country FE AR(1) – 
Country FE 
Country FE AR(1) – 
Country FE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
(Growth Tax)t-1 0.167*** 0.183*** 0.114** 0.110*** 
 (0.049) (0.047) (0.042) (0.037) 
(Growth Tax)t-2 -0.017 -0.005 0.039 0.055* 
 (0.083) (0.040) (0.028) (0.032) 
(Growth Tax)t-3 0.071* 0.071* 0.063 0.075** 
 (0.037) (0.039) (0.048) (0.031) 
(Growth Tax)t-4 0.069** 0.037 0.064*** 0.043 
 (0.027) (0.038) (0.014) (0.031) 
(Log(GDP per capita)) t-1 -6.015** -9.807*** -0.437 -2.476 
 (2.223) (2.412) (2.864) (2.832) 
Urbanisationt-1 -0.409** -0.424** -0.421** -0.370* 
 (0.183) (0.201) (0.170) (0.190) 
(Trade/GDP)t-1   0.017 0.017 
   (0.021) (0.019) 
(Pop Growth)t-1 0.980 1.313   
 (0.732) (0.868)   
(Pop Growth Age 6-10)t-1   -0.550*** -0.501*** 
   (0.147) (0.187) 
(Pop Growth Age 11-17)t-1   0.181 0.276 
   (0.169) (0.201) 
(Pop Growth Age 18-23)t-1   0.026 0.026 
   (0.177) (0.219) 
Left government t -0.617 -0.532 0.870* 0.830 
 (0.751) (0.762) (0.503) (0.633) 
Constant 94.275*** 134.515*** 34.082 41.282* 
 (28.682) (23.169) (28.615) (24.994) 
Observations 577 549 578 550 
R-squared 0.079 0.094 0.105 0.089 
Number of Countries 28 28 28 28 
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses in regressions (1) and 
(3). 
 
Next, Table 6 estimates the impact of growth in tax revenues on public healthcare 
expenditures and public education expenditures in two separate regressions. (1) and (3) 
respectively estimate public healthcare expenditures and public education expenditures using 
country-fixed effects. (2) and (4) are AR(1) regressions with country-fixed effects which aim to 
reduce possible autocorrelation problems.  
 
Table 7: Impact of growth in tax revenues (%) on growth of public education expenditures 
(%) in primary, secondary and tertiary education in the EU-28, fixed effects regressions 
(1991-2017)  
 Growth Public Primary 
Exp. (%) 
Growth Public Secondary 
Exp. (%) 
Growth Public Tertiary 
Exp. (%) 
 Country 
FE 
AR(1) – 
Country FE 
Country FE AR(1) – 
Country FE 
Country FE AR(1) – 
Country FE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
(Growth Tax)t-1 0.251** 0.248*** 0.178*** 0.161** 0.029 -0.044 
 (0.092) (0.085) (0.059) (0.072) (0.065) (0.088) 
(Growth Tax)t-2 0.057 0.066 0.067 0.064 0.034 0.095 
 (0.068) (0.082) (0.051) (0.069) (0.086) (0.084) 
(Growth Tax)t-3 0.035 0.030 0.150** 0.129* 0.026 0.026 
 (0.093) (0.079) (0.069) (0.067) (0.078) (0.082) 
(Growth Tax)t-4 0.039 0.012 0.095* 0.029 0.192*** 0.149* 
 (0.067) (0.079) (0.051) (0.067) (0.068) (0.082) 
(Log(GDP per capita)) t-1 -0.597 -1.061 -2.284 -1.311 -18.728** -25.507*** 
 (5.775) (7.264) (4.959) (6.104) (7.133) (7.576) 
Urbanisationt-1 -0.357 -0.276 -0.060 -0.079 -0.532 -0.572 
 (0.329) (0.402) (0.216) (0.378) (0.328) (0.442) 
(Trade/GDP) t-1 -0.004 -0.012 0.006 -0.007 0.101*** 0.104** 
 (0.032) (0.041) (0.021) (0.039) (0.031) (0.045) 
(Pop Growth Age 6-10)t-1 -0.407** -0.395     
 (0.167) (0.392)     
(Pop Growth Age 11-17)t-1   0.627** 0.361   
   (0.264) (0.395)   
(Pop Growth Age 18-23)t-1     0.768** 0.693 
     (0.342) (0.476) 
Left government t -1.947 -2.019 1.552* 1.916 1.273 1.644 
 (1.814) (1.405) (0.830) (1.290) (0.971) (1.516) 
Constant 34.775 29.445 28.431 14.074 222.809*** 225.579*** 
 (49.485) (65.991) (46.884) (50.606) (67.586) (65.164) 
Observations 523 495 523 495 523 495 
R-squared 0.038 0.032 0.053 0.028 0.066 0.058 
Number of Countries 28 28 28 28 28 28 
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses in regressions (1) , (3), 
and (5).  
 
Governments that experience a decrease in the growth of tax revenues might not 
immediately reflect this decline to their education and healthcare spending. However, the 
slowdown in the growth of tax revenues might increase the public indebtedness in the medium 
and long run, which would push governments to reduce the growth of their healthcare and 
education expenditures. To control the lagged effects of tax revenues on public budgets, the 
analysis controls the impact of one-to-four-year lags of tax revenue growth. Moreover, due to 
possible endogeneity issues, the one-year lags of the other independent variables are used. 
For all four regressions, the impact of all four lags of tax growth is positive, and tax 
growth’s one-year lags are significant at 5% level. For growth in public healthcare expenditures, 
the three-year growth of tax revenues is positive and significant at 10% level. In regression (1), 
the four-year lag of growth in tax revenues have, at 5% level, significant impact effects on 
growth in public healthcare expenditures. In regression (3), the four-year lag of growth in tax 
revenues and in regression (4) the three-year lag of growth in tax revenues have significant 
positive effects on growth in public education expenditures at 5% level. 
Next, Table 7 estimates the impact of one-to-four-year lags of growth in tax revenues on 
growth in public primary, secondary, and tertiary education expenditures in separate estimations 
using regressions with country-fixed effects and AR(1) country-fixed effects estimations. The 
estimations highlight that all lags of growth in tax revenues have a positive impact on growth in 
public primary and secondary education expenditures, and the coefficients for one-year lags are 
significant at 5%. The three-year lags of tax growth, at 5% and 10% levels, have a significant 
effect on growth in public secondary education expenditures in (3) and (4), respectively. The 
four-year lags of growth in tax revenues, at 1% and 10% levels, have a significant effect on 
growth in public tertiary education expenditures in (5) and (6), respectively. 
Alternative estimations in Appendix 2 also show that decline in various lags of growth in 
taxes increases the probability of implementing of austerity measures, reduction in public 
healthcare and public education expenditures at all levels (primary, secondary, tertiary). The 
estimations also reflect that the left wing governments in the EU-28 are less likely to implement 
austerity measures in education. 
Last, Table 8 exhibits the economic significance of the empirical estimations in this 
section. Using the coefficients in Tables 3, 6, and 7, Table 8 shows the impact of 1% point and 
one standard deviation change of different financialisation measures on the growth in total public 
education, public health healthcare, public primary education, and public secondary expenditures 
in the EU-28 countries over the four-year time. For this, the estimated coefficients of the 
financialisation measures in Table 3 (𝛽!"#$#%&,!!!) and estimated coefficients of the tax growth 
in Table 6 and Table 7 (𝛽!"#$%&'!!,!!!,𝛽!"#$%&'!!,!!!, 𝛽!"#$%&'!!,!!!,𝛽!"#$%&'!!,!!! ) are used 
in the following equation: 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡 𝑜𝑓 1% 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒= 𝛽!"#$#%&,!!! ∗ ((1 + 𝛽!"#$%&'!!,!!!)(1 + 𝛽!"#$%&'!!,!!!)(1 + 𝛽!"#$%&'!!,!!!)(1+ 𝛽!"#$%&'!!,!!!) − 1)	
 
 
Table 8: Impact of 1 percentage point change in measures of financialisation on growth in 
public social expenditures in EU-28 countries over four years (1991 - 2017) 
Variable 
Growth in public education 
expenditures (%) 
Growth in public healthcare 
expenditures (%) 
Impact of 1% 
point change  
Impact of one 
standard 
deviation change 
Impact of 1% 
point change  
Impact of one 
standard 
deviation 
change 
FIRE VA/GDP (%) -0.188, -0.192 -0.90, -0.91 -0.188, -0.192 -0.89, -0.91 
Private credit/GDP (%) -0.025, -0.026 -1.17, -1.19 -0.025, -0.026 -1.17, -1.19 
Nonfin debt/GDP (%) -0.011 -0.57, -0.58 -0.011 -0.57, -0.58 
Household debt/GDP (%) -0.034, -0.035 -0.98, -1.00 -0.034, -0.035 -0.98, -1.00 
Nonfin property/VA (%) -0.047, -0.048 -0.56, -0.57 -0.047, -0.048 -0.56, -0.57 
Variable 
Growth in public primary 
education expenditures (%) 
Growth in public secondary 
education expenditures (%) 
Impact of 1% 
point change  
Impact of one 
standard 
deviation change 
Impact of 1% 
point change  
Impact of one 
standard 
deviation 
change 
FIRE VA/GDP (%) -0.237, -0.259 -1.13, -1.23 -0.267, -0.357 -1.27, -1.70 
Private credit/GDP (%) -0.032, -0.035 -1.47, -1.60 -0.036, -0.048 -1.65, -2.21 
Nonfin debt/GDP (%) -0.014, -0.015 -0.71, -0.78 -0.015, -0.020 -0.80, -1.08 
Household debt/GDP (%) -0.043, -0.047 -1.23, -1.34 -0.048, -0.065 -1.38, -1.85 
Nonfin property/VA (%) -0.059, -0.065 -0.70, -0.77 -0.067, -0.089 -0.79, -1.06 
Variable 
Growth in public tertiary 
education expenditures (%) 
Impact of 1% 
point change  
Impact of one 
standard 
deviation change 
FIRE VA/GDP (%) -0.143, -0.185 -0.68, -0.88 
Private credit/GDP (%) -0.019, -0.025 -0.89, -1.14 
Nonfin debt/GDP (%) -0.008, -0.011 -0.43, -0.56 
Household debt/GDP (%) -0.026, -0.033 -0.74, -0.96 
Nonfin property/VA (%) -0.036, -0.046 -0.43, -0.55 
 
Following Ziliak and McCloskey’s (2004, 2008) critiques on the dismissal of statistically 
insignificant variables, the analysis considers the effects of variables that are statistically 
insignificant in the econometric regressions. For most variables, two different effects are 
reported since the coefficients of country-fixed effects and AR(1) country-fixed effects 
regressions are slightly different. For public primary education expenditures, only one value is 
reported, since the values coming from country-fixed effects and AR(1) country-fixed effects 
regressions are the same at three-digit level. 
Table 8 shows that different measures of financialisation have very similar effects on 
total public education expenditures and public healthcare expenditures. The impact is the largest 
in household debts and domestic credits given to the private sector. A one-standard-deviation 
change in household debt/GDP respectively reduces both yearly growth in public education and 
public healthcare expenditures by 0.98–1.00 percentage points. Similarly, a one-standard-
deviation change in domestic private credit/GDP decreases growth in both public education and 
in public healthcare expenditures by 1.17–1.19 percentage points. A one-standard-deviation 
change in FIRE VA/GDP reduces yearly growth in public education expenditures by 0.90–0.91 
percentage points and yearly growth in public healthcare expenditures by 0.89–0.91 percentage 
points. The magnitudes of financialisation variables are larger when growth in public primary 
and secondary education variables are separately examined. 
 
 
 
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
6. Does financialisation create opportunities that successfully replace public spending in 
education and healthcare? 
A group of studies approaches financialisation by focusing on the ‘financialisation of the 
everyday’ (van der Zwan, 2004), which involves the replacement of services previously provided 
by the welfare state with the purchase financial products. Indeed, FESSUD (2017) notes that 
during the new wave of financialisation starting in early 1980s, “the expansion (of capital 
investments) … aimed mainly to the systematic invasion of the territory formerly occupied by 
the Welfare State (health, education, pensions, and so on). In particular, the rules underlying the 
introduction of the Euro and the austerity policies implemented after the crisis went a long way 
towards the dismantling of the Welfare State in the EU, and the systematic privatisation of 
health, education, and social security services (including pensions).” Similarly, Karwowski 
(2019) discusses the growth of the student loan market and private health insurance schemes as 
an aspect of the ‘financialisation of social infrastructure.’ 
Following these arguments, this section of the paper will examine whether the new 
opportunities created with ‘financialisation of the everyday’ can support the education and 
healthcare sectors, while the growth of governments’ social expenditures are declining in the EU 
countries. The paper first examines the case of the United Kingdom, in which significant tuition 
fees are introduced in universities and the access to university education is supported by growing 
student loans. Next, the paper will examine the cases of the Netherlands and Germany, in which 
private insurance schemes are used for replacing the public insurance schemes in healthcare. 
 
6.1 Higher education reforms in the United Kingdom 
Until 1998, the United Kingdom had a university education system with no fees for full-time 
domestic students. Nevertheless, the students would still have to cover their living expenses, and 
the majority of the students covered their expenses through a government loan. In 1998, Tony 
Blair government introduced a package of education reforms including the tuition fees due to the 
government’s concerns on declining quality in the universities (Murphy, Scott-Clayton, and 
Wyness, 2018). According to the 1998 reforms, the tuition fees were capped at £1,000 per year, 
and a new income contingent loan (ICL) system was introduced across the constituent countries 
(England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland) of the United Kingdom. According to the ICL 
system, the borrowers started to pay their loans after graduation and only those who work and 
earn over £10,000 per year had to start repayment of their loans. In 2006/07, the cap for the 
tuition fees in England increased to £3,000 per year and accordingly the threshold income for 
repayment of loans rose to £15,000. The education reforms implemented in 2012/13 increased 
the cap for the tuition fees in England to £9,000 and the minimum income threshold for 
repayment of loans to £21,000. Last, the cap for the tuition fees and minimum income threshold 
for repayment in England respectively were adjusted to £9,250 in 2017/18 and to £25,000 in 
2018/19.  
 Scotland also introduced the tuition fees of £1,000 per year in 1998. However, Scotland 
diverged from the rest of the United Kingdom, as the tuition fees in Scotland were replaced with 
an endowment scheme in 2001 (Sa, 2014). Scottish-domiciled students were required to pay 
£2,000 after graduation. In 2007, the Scottish government entirely removed the fees on the 
university education for Scottish-domiciled students. In Wales, the cap on tuition fees increased 
to £9,000 in line with England; however, the Welsh government started to pay the tuition fee 
costs over £3,465 of Welsh students studying at any university in the UK.  In 2012, the tuition 
fees in Northern Ireland were also capped at £3,465 for students in Northern Ireland. 
 The government’s contribution to tertiary education also significantly declined while the 
‘reforms’ in the university education system in the UK were implemented. Between 1997 and 
2017, public expenditures in the UK on tertiary education declined by 30.9% in real terms9. 
Moreover, public tertiary expenditures’ share in GDP dropped from 0.57% in 1997 to 0.26% in 
2017.   
With these education reforms, England, Northern Ireland, and Wales became outliers in 
the EU in terms of student fees in higher education. Table 9 demonstrates that the most common 
annual student fees in first-cycle higher education among home fee-paying students in all EU 
countries except England, Northern Ireland, and Wales is lower than €3,000 and is zero in six 
EU countries.  
 
Table 9: Most common annual student fees in first-cycle higher education among home fee-
paying students in the EU-28 countries (2018/19) 
Student fee Countries 
> EUR 3000 England, Northern Ireland and Wales 
Between EUR 1001 - 3000 Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain 
Between EUR 101 - 1000 Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Luxembourg, Romania 
Between EUR 1 - 100 Croatia, Czech Republic, Germany, Latvia, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia 
No fees Austria, Cyprus, Denmark, Greece, Finland, Malta, Scotland, Sweden 
Source: European Commission/EACEA/Eurydice (2018) 
Note: Latvia and Estonia are not classified due to lack of data. 
 
In addition, following the introduction of student fees and the income-contingent loan 
scheme, the increase in gross tertiary enrolment rate has been small in the United Kingdom 
compared to other EU countries. Figure 16 reflects that gross tertiary enrolment rates of 
countries like Austria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Poland, and Slovenia, which had 
gross tertiary enrolment rates lower than that of the United Kingdom, exceeded the enrolment 
																																								 																				
9 Author’s calculations based on Eurostat (2019) and World Bank’s (2019) World Development Indicators. 
rates in the United Kingdom by 2016. According to the World Bank’s (2019) World 
Development Indicators data, in 1997 the United Kingdom had the second largest gross 
enrolment rate in tertiary education among the 25 EU countries with available data. Following 
the higher education reforms, by 2016 the United Kingdom dropped to 22nd place in terms of 
gross enrolment rate in tertiary education among the 27 EU countries with available data.  
Different empirical studies find different effects of the tuition fees and income contingent 
loans. Dearden, Fitzsimons and Wyness (2011)’s estimations for 1992–2007 show that a £1,000 
increase in tuition fees reduced the probability of university participation at the age of 18–19 by 
3.9 percentage points in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland. However, Azmat and Simion 
(2018) find smaller negative effects and estimate that the 2006 and 2012 reforms reduced tertiary 
enrolment in England respectively by 0.7% and 0.2%.  
 
Source: World Development Indicators (2019) 
Note: The gross enrolment rate in tertiary education (%) is the ratio of total enrolment, regardless of age, to the 
population of the age groups that officially corresponds to the level of education shown. 
	
On the other hand, Sa’s (2014) estimations on 2001 reforms in Scotland show that a 
£1,000 reduction in yearly tuition fees led to an increase of 8% on student applications. 
Moreover, Sa also shows that the tuition fee increases in 2012 significantly reduced the student 
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Figure 16: Gross enrolment rates in tertiary education (%) in the 
selected EU countries 
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applications in higher education in England and the negative effects are larger for the subjects 
with lower employment probabilities and lower average wages after graduation. Moreover, the 
increase in tuition fees in 2012 significantly reduced the attendance of students in England 
according to Sa’s estimations. 
The higher education system that increasingly is based on student loans also accelerated 
the accumulation of the student debt. Figure 17 shows the student debt (loan debt outstanding at 
financial year end) as a share of GDP (%) in the United Kingdom. The student debt/GDP ratio 
that was 0.7% in 2002/03 increased to 1.2% in 2006/07. Nevertheless, with the introduction of 
£3,000 and £9,000 university fees in England, the student debt/GDP ratio in the UK respectively 
jumped to 2.9% in 2012/13 and to 5.8% in 2017/18. The rapidly rising student debt also 
significantly contributes to total household debt in the UK, which is likely to significantly reduce 
the growth rate and growth of tax revenue and have further negative effects on public education 
and healthcare expenditures in the UK as empirically shown in Section 5.2. 
	
Source: Student Loans Company (2019) and ONS (2019).  
Note: GDP in the denominator of the ratio (%) is GDP in the second year of the given school year. 
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Figure 17: Student debt (Loan debt outstanding at financial year end)/
GDP (%) in the United Kingdom 
6.2 Private healthcare insurance schemes in Netherlands and Germany 
Another aspect of financialisation is the extension of private insurance companies’ role in the 
financing of healthcare. Since WWII, the majority of European governments successfully 
implemented universal public insurance schemes for healthcare. However, the Netherlands and 
Germany are the two EU economies where compulsory private insurance schemes have been 
playing an important role in the financing of healthcare expenditures. Unlike in any other 
European Union country, compulsory private health insurance schemes finance more than half of 
the healthcare expenditures in the Netherlands (Table 10; Eurostat, 2019). In Germany, citizens 
have the choice of public or private insurance, and compulsory private health insurance financed 
7.6% of all health expenditures in 2015, which is larger than all other European Union members 
except the Netherlands (Table 10; Eurostat, 2019)10. 
	
Table 10: Share of compulsory and voluntary health insurance contributions in all 
healthcare expenditures (%) in the selected EU countries and the US in 2015 
  
Compulsory private 
health insurance as a 
share of all health 
expenditures (%) 
Voluntary health 
insurance as a share 
of all health 
expenditures (%) 
Compulsory + voluntary 
health insurance as a share 
of all health expenditures 
(%) 
Netherlands 55.1 6.0 61.1 
Germany 7.6 1.5 9.1 
France 0 13.0 13.0 
Italy 0 1.5 1.5 
Spain 0 4.6 4.6 
United Kingdom 0.1 3.4 3.5 
United States 32.4 2.7 35.1 
Source: Eurostat (2019) and OECD (2019). 
 
The Netherlands had the choice of public or private insurance between 1941 and 1986. In 
1986, the Netherlands abolished the choice between public and private insurance and simply 
moved to a system in which higher earners were excluded from the public insurance scheme 
(Thomson and Mossialos, 2006). In 2006, the Netherlands made private health insurance 
mandatory for everyone with the Health Insurance Act (Zorgverzekeringswet, ZVW). The new 
system replaced the dual system in which two-thirds of the population was subject to mandatory 
public health insurance and the rest of the population relied on private insurance (Schut, Sorbe, 
and Høj, 2013). As a part of the scheme, the citizens started to pay a flat premium for the basic 
scheme irrespective of income, age, or health status. The citizens’ contributions cover 50% of the 
																																								 																				
10 Starting in 2016, all employers in France were required to provide private complementary health insurance to 
their employees as a part of the National Inter-Professional Agreement (NIA) (Franc and Pierre, 2015). However, 
this paper will not discuss the French case, as the long-term outcomes of this policy are not yet observed and the 
National Inter-Professional Agreement does not focus on primary health insurance. 
total premium costs, and the other half of the premium is covered by employers’ contributions 
(Van Ginneken, Busse, and Gericke, 2008). Moreover, the insurance companies became obliged 
to accept all applicants to the basic scheme, which is mandatory for all citizens (Maarse, 
Jeurissen and Ruwaard, 2016). Nevertheless, the companies can reject the applications for 
complementary schemes and premiums can vary. 
Following the 2006 Healthcare Reforms, private health insurance companies in the 
Netherlands experienced losses in 2007–2008 (Schut, Sorbe, and Høj, 2013). However, the 
health insurance companies started to profit in 2009 with the introduction of differentiated 
supplementary health insurance packages and rising concentration in health insurance markets. 
By 2011, the four largest health insurance companies controlled 90% of the health insurance 
markets. Moreover, with the 2006 reforms, the administrative costs of healthcare insurance 
companies increased, since a highly complex product classification system called the DBC 
system was introduced and number of contractual arrangements and information requirements 
from supervisory bodies and health insurers also increased. 
The life expectancy and cost of healthcare expenditures data reflects that the Netherlands 
healthcare system based on private health insurance schemes is less efficient than schemes in the 
rest of the EU countries. First, the per capita healthcare expenditures in the Netherlands was 
between 28.0% and 38.8% higher than the EU-15 average in 2006–2016 (Figure 18). Moreover, 
the per capita healthcare expenditures in the Netherlands were between 93.3% and 135.3% larger 
than the EU-28 average in the post-2005 period and were larger than all large European 
economies (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom). Nevertheless, the life 
expectancy in the Netherlands was lower than the EU-15 average and only 0.6–1.1 years higher 
than the EU-28 average in the same period. In addition, the life expectancy in the Netherlands 
was respectively lower than Italy and Spain by 1.7 and 1.8 years in 2016, even though Italy and 
Spain’s per capita healthcare expenditures were lower. The high healthcare costs and relatively 
lower life expectancy in the Netherlands show similarities with healthcare in the United States, 
where historically private healthcare insurance schemes play a significant role in its healthcare 
system (Cacare, 2010). 
The other EU economy with significant use of compulsory private health insurance, 
Germany, introduced a choice between public and private insurance in 1970 (in West Germany) 
by allowing white-collar employees with lower incomes to enrol in public statutory health 
insurance (GKV, Gesetzlichen Krankenkassen) (Thomson and Mossialos, 2006). Before 1970, 
GKV only covered blue-collar workers. However, the distinction between white- and blue-collar 
workers was eliminated in 1989, and the public or private health insurance choice became 
available for blue-collar workers above a certain income level. The Health Care Structure Act of 
1993 allowed workers the right to switch between funds freely, irrespective of occupation, 
starting in 1996 (Busse et al., 2017). 
Currently all pensioners, employees below an income threshold, and non-earning 
dependants are included in GKV. Individuals above a certain income level (the compulsory 
insurance threshold) and the self-employed can keep statutory health insurance or can switch to 
private health insurance on a voluntary basis (Busse et al., 2017; Panthöfer, 2016). However, 
shifts between the two systems are highly regulated. Once the individual opts up from the public 
insurance system, returning back to the public insurance system is restricted and only possible 
when the individual loses the criteria for being eligible for the private insurance threshold (e.g., 
annual income regularly falling below public health insurance income or being unemployed). 
Moreover, individuals over the age of 54 cannot switch between public and private insurance 
systems under any circumstances. Also, the private insurance companies are required to offer 
long-term contracts with guaranteed renewing rates (Hofmann and Browne, 2013). However, 
private insurance companies are allowed to deny coverage and have substantial freedom to 
decide on the premium and the extent of coverage (Polyakova, 2016).  
	
	Source:	Author’s	calculations	based	on	the	World	Bank	(2019).	
	
Several empirical studies examine the outcomes of the dual health insurance system in 
Germany. Panthöfer (2016) for 1998–2011 empirically finds that healthy individuals were more 
likely to switch to private insurance plans and pay low insurance premiums, whereas sick 
individuals prefer public insurance systems. Panthöfer’s findings reflect that private insurers 
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Figure 18: Per capita healthcare expenditures (public + private) in the 
selected EU countries, EU-28, EU-15 and the United States 
Germany Netherlands EU-28 
EU-15 France Italy 
Spain United Kingdom United States 
screened their applicants and determined insurance premiums accordingly. Moreover, the 
German government raised premiums to compensate for the costs for rising average risk. 
Similarly, in another empirical analysis for 2000–2007, Grunow and Nuscheler  (2014) find that 
less healthy individuals were more likely to switch to public insurance and more healthy 
individuals were likely to stay in public insurance. This generated an ‘adverse selection11’ 
problem, since the public insurance system was left with relatively unhealthy individuals.  
In terms of the overall outcomes, although per capita healthcare expenditures were 21.6% 
greater in Germany than the EU-15 average in 2016 (Figure 18), life expectancy in Germany was 
1.0 year lower than the EU-15 average (Figure 19). Hence, the healthcare system in Germany 
was less efficient compared to the EU-15 average. 
	
 Source: World Bank (2019) and author’s calculations based on the World Bank. The life expectancies for EU-28 
and EU-15 are population-weighted averages of life expectancies in the countries included in each group. 
	
	
	
	
																																								 																				
11 Adverse selection is a term in the economic literature for describing a case where market participation is 
influenced due to asymmetric information between buyers and sellers and therefore an efficient equilibrium in the 
market cannot be reached. 
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Figure 19: Life expectancy in the selected EU countries, EU-28, EU-15 
and the United States 
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7. Conclusion and policy implications 
This paper examines the impact of financialisation on social infrastructure in the European 
Union. The empirical results show that financialisation slowed the growth in tax revenues in the 
European Union by reducing economic growth and the share of tax revenues in GDP. The lower 
growth in tax revenues also reduces the growth rates of public education and public healthcare 
expenditures by limiting the sources for the public sector. The negative impact of financialisation 
on public social expenditures is most visible through its effect on household debts, domestic 
credits given to the private sector, and the share of the FIRE sector in GDP. Moreover, the 
empirical estimates found a negative impact of financialisation on public primary, secondary, 
and tertiary education expenditures.  
Public social expenditures are crucial determinants of long-term growth, productivity, 
and overall economic development. For relieving the negative effects of financialisation on 
public education and healthcare expenditures, EU countries could consider tightening regulations 
in the financial markets and increase the taxes on financial transactions. This would push firms to 
direct their profits towards non-financial activities and physical investments. Moreover, a 
significant increase in taxes on financial transactions would generate extra tax revenues that 
would finance possible increases public social expenditures.  
 This paper also hinted that the financialisation of social infrastructure does not lead to 
improvements in education and healthcare. Following the higher education reforms, the tertiary 
enrolment stagnated and the burden of student loans increased geometrically in the United 
Kingdom. The expansion of student loans in the UK is also an important impediment on 
consumption and growth in the UK. Moreover, the Netherlands, whose healthcare system is 
based on private insurance schemes, has a life expectancy lower than the EU-15 average even 
though per capital healthcare expenditures in the Netherlands are significantly higher than the 
EU-15 and EU-28 averages. Several studies on Germany (e.g., Panthöfer, 2016; Grunow and 
Nuscheler, 2014) show that the dual healthcare system based on mandatory public and private 
health insurance schemes led to and ‘adverse selection’ problem and increased the costs and 
premiums in the public health insurance schemes. The cases of the UK, the Netherlands, and 
Germany reflect that policymakers should be cautious on implementing systems based on student 
loans and private insurance schemes. 
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Appendix 1: The impact of four-year averages of measures of financialisation on the 
growth of public social expenditures 
This appendix examines the direct impact of financialisation on public healthcare expenditures 
and public social expenditures using the moving average of one-to-four year lags of the measures 
of financialisation. Hence, the moving average of each indicator of financialisation is: 𝑥 = 𝑥!!! + 𝑥!!! + 𝑥!!! + 𝑥!!!4  
where 𝑥! is a measure of financialisation. Table A1.1 and Table A1.2 respectively test the direct 
impact of financialisation on the growth of public healthcare and education expenditures. The 
four-year moving averages of FIRE VA/GDP, Credit/GDP, Nonfin debt/GDP, and House 
debt/GDP have, at 5% level, a significant negative impact on the growth of public healthcare 
expenditures and public education expenditures. The estimations also show that Nonfin 
property/VA has a negative impact on the growth of public healthcare and education 
expenditures; however, the effects are insignificant at 10% level. 
 
Table A1.1: Impact of four-year averages of measures of financialisation on the growth of 
public healthcare expenditures (%) in the EU-28, fixed-effects regressions (1991–2017) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Fire VA/GDP (4y average) -0.856***     
 (0.138)     
Credit/GDP (4y average)  -0.051**    
  (0.020)    
Nonfin debt/GDP (4y average)   -0.048**   
   (0.020)   
House debt/GDP (4y average)    -0.156***  
    (0.033)  
Nonfin property/VA (4y average)     -0.035 
     (0.078) 
(Log(GDP per capita)) t-1 -2.162 6.166 -1.742 4.181 -5.151** 
 (1.809) (3.935) (4.524) (3.597) (2.414) 
Urbanisationt-1 -0.224** -0.492 -0.242 0.195 -0.614** 
 (0.090) (0.368) (0.177) (0.138) (0.229) 
(Trade/GDP)t-1 0.010 0.020 0.043 0.010 0.008 
 (0.011) (0.016) (0.026) (0.024) (0.030) 
(Log(Inflation + x)) t-1 0.915 -1.625 1.399 0.845 3.788*** 
 (1.058) (1.060) (1.353) (1.281) (1.315) 
Pop Growth t-1 0.280 1.472** 1.301 1.025 0.168 
 (0.679) (0.640) (0.776) (0.709) (1.080) 
Left government t 0.483 0.750 0.985 0.795 0.120 
 (0.645) (0.529) (0.665) (0.609) (0.805) 
Constant 51.288** -21.179 36.098 -50.613 92.109*** 
 (21.707) (45.195) (45.993) (36.030) (29.723) 
Observations 574 344 368 368 502 
R-squared 0.072 0.079 0.123 0.204 0.077 
Number of Countries 28 28 18 18 27 
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
Table A1.2: Impact of four-year averages of measures of financialisation on the growth of 
public education expenditures (%) in the EU-28, fixed-effects regressions (1991–2017) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Fire VA/GDP (4y average) -0.635***     
 (0.142)     
Credit/GDP (4y average)  -0.072***    
  (0.016)    
Nonfin debt/GDP (4y average)   -0.038**   
   (0.014)   
House debt/GDP (4y average)    -0.117***  
    (0.030)  
Nonfin property/VA (4y average)     -0.054 
     (0.067) 
(Log(GDP per capita)) t-1 -1.082 -5.725 1.269 4.987** -1.247 
 (3.087) (4.446) (2.377) (1.999) (2.929) 
Urbanisationt-1 -0.297** -0.190 -0.341* -0.002 -0.525** 
 (0.139) (0.240) (0.183) (0.179) (0.216) 
(Trade/GDP)t-1 0.012 0.024 0.026 -0.002 0.021 
 (0.017) (0.024) (0.017) (0.013) (0.026) 
(Log(Inflation + x)) t-1 -0.220 -0.280 -0.011 -0.444 0.473 
 (0.917) (0.691) (1.196) (1.003) (1.104) 
(Pop Growth Age 6-10)t-1 -0.452*** -0.232 -0.508** -0.261 -0.641*** 
 (0.143) (0.266) (0.200) (0.187) (0.167) 
(Pop Growth Age 11-17)t-1 0.154 0.334* 0.036 0.096 0.216 
 (0.174) (0.196) (0.215) (0.199) (0.242) 
(Pop Growth Age 18-23)t-1 -0.004 0.112 -0.047 0.033 0.031 
 (0.148) (0.224) (0.204) (0.188) (0.181) 
Left government t 1.178** 0.886 1.366* 1.232* 0.992* 
 (0.512) (0.752) (0.682) (0.615) (0.530) 
Constant 42.873 79.058* 14.707 -43.242 49.463 
 (32.108) (43.607) (26.317) (26.997) (31.392) 
Observations 575 345 368 368 503 
R-squared 0.094 0.101 0.151 0.192 0.087 
Number of Countries 28 28 18 18 27 
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses.  
 																
Appendix 2: Determinants of austerity measures on social infrastructure in the EU-28 
countries 
This appendix examines the impact of one-to-four-year lags of growth in tax revenues on the 
probability of implementing austerity measures on total public healthcare, total public education, 
public primary, public secondary, and public tertiary education expenditures in the EU-28 in 
1991–2017. Using probit analysis, Table A2.1 reflects the factors that influence the probability 
of reducing total public healthcare, total public education, public primary, public secondary, and 
public tertiary education expenditures within the observed year. For most of the lags of growth in 
taxes, the growth of taxes at 5% significantly reduces the probability of implementing austerity 
measures on public social expenditures. Moreover, the results show that a left-wing government, 
at 10% level, is significantly less likely to reduce total public education expenditures, and at 5% 
level is significantly less likely to reduce public secondary education expenditures. 
 
 
Table A2.1: Determinant of austerity measures in social infrastructure in the EU-28 
countries in 1991-2017 (no reduction in public social expenditures=0, reduction in public 
social expenditures=1): Marginal effects from probit analysis 
 Health Education 
(Total) 
Primary 
education 
Secondary 
education 
Tertiary 
education 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
(Growth Tax)t-1 -0.008*** -0.004** -0.008*** -0.010*** -0.005** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
(Growth Tax)t-2 -0.000 -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.005** -0.005** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
(Growth Tax)t-3 -0.006*** -0.002 -0.005*** -0.008*** -0.004 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
(Growth Tax)t-4 -0.005*** -0.007*** -0.005** -0.007*** -0.007*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
(Log(GDP per capita)) t-1 -0.068 -0.097 -0.081 0.118** 0.085 
 (0.047) (0.061) (0.053) (0.056) (0.052) 
Urbanisationt-1 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
(Trade/GDP) t-1 0.001** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
(Pop Growth)t-1 -0.040     
 (0.025)     
(Pop Growth Age 6-10)t-1  0.027** 0.018**   
  (0.011) (0.009)   
(Pop Growth Age 11-17)t-1  -0.010  -0.046***  
  (0.010)  (0.011)  
(Pop Growth Age 18-23)t-1  -0.004   -0.048*** 
  (0.010)   (0.010) 
Left government t -0.026 -0.067* -0.004 -0.137*** -0.058 
 (0.031) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.037) 
Observations 647 648 648 648 648 
Log likelihood -287.59 -340.10 -331.92 -356.55 -361.58 
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Coefficient is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. 
Marginal effects for the non-dummy variables are calculated at the means.  
